A Closer Look at Martin Brodeur's Save Percentages by Season
I've thought a lot of Martin Brodeur, legendary goaltender for the New Jersey Devils, over the past two weeks. Mostly that was due to reviewing the goals he allowed in this past season. While I'll summarize those results tomorrow, I wanted point out something I found interesting at NHL.com in the meantime. The players' stats page has a section for splits where goaltending data is divided up among even strength, power play, and shorthanded situations. I believe this is a sensible way of breaking down save percentage as the non-even strength situations are likely going to be more difficult for a goaltender. From my viewpoint, the goalie is facing one (or two) more attacking players than his defense can account for in a power play situation; and shorthanded shots are usually the result of a breakdown by his own team - meaning that while uncommon, they can be commonly dangerous.
These splits go as far back as the 1997-1998 season; back when Brodeur was 25 and the Devils had only one Stanley Cup. I decided to take the data listed from each season from NHL.com and put it into a chart. I found that Brodeur's even strength save percentage was less variable than the special teams situations, among some other interesting findings. Check it out after the jump.

Since 1997-98, Martin Brodeur has played 13 seasons; staying mostly healthy for all but two of them. You'll notice the even strength save percentage took a dive in this most recent season, ending a seven-season run of 92% or better. That's pretty impressive as Brodeur kept that up while entering the later stages of his career and missing a season due to the labor disputes of 2004. If Brodeur wasn't 39, then I would suspect some people would expect a rebound in performance in 2011-12 based on this past history. After all, the last time he hit 91.2% was over a decade ago. Alas, that will not be said. What will be is that Brodeur is near the end of his career and it's showing in his stats (despite what a review of the goals he allowed show, of course; but that's for tomorrow).
What sticks out on this chart are the special teams percentages. They're all over the place. Brodeur's had 3 seasons where he did well in power play situations, surpassing the 89% mark. But they're really the exception as the rest is mired in between 83.9% and 87.8%. It suggests that goaltenders suffer when their team is down a man or two; which I don't think should surprise anyone. Shorthanded percentages look a little better in comparison. However, the small population of shorthanded shots against makes it easier for percentages to shift even with the shorthanded goals staying around 4-6 goals (2006-07 excepted).
By calculating the mean and standard deviation of each situation, you'll see further evidence of the variability of save percentage in special team situations as opposed to even strength play. I also divided up pre-2004 and post-2004 lockout situations just for curiosity's sake.

Huh. Brodeur has better save percentages after the 2004 lockout as opposed to when he was in his prime earlier. Granted, I'd love to have seen the splits for his amazing 1996-97 season (92.7% total save percentage - yeah, total) included; that may balance this out further. Still, it seems that his relatively poor even strength save percentage from 2010-11 is somewhat balanced out by the amazing 93.3% he posted in his injury-shortened 2008-09 season; and the other four seasons aren't dragged down too much.
Here's a question: what happened prior to the lockout that caused Brodeur to not put up similar numbers? I suspect it may be a function of the awesome defense in front of him (and potentially scorer bias) reducing the number of shots, thereby driving percentages down. Since Stevens, Niedermayer, et. al. were gone in 2005-06 along with some changes in the game that led to more attacking play, shots against at evens went up by about 200, Brodeur just made more saves, and the percentages improved even with allowing a few more goals.
Jumping back to the special teams, check out the standard deviations (S.D.) for power play and shorthanded situations and compare them to the even strength standard deviations. The difference is quite stark. A higher standard deviation means there's more variability. I didn't think that bearing out in the results is too surprising. With power plays and shorthanded situations, there's more variation because those situations aren't always guaranteed. The Devils don't draw a lot of penalties, they don't take a lot of them, and it varies from game to game whether the ref even calls them. That's just for the situations themselves, whether the other team does anything on them is another factor. While the population size isn't large, it (further) justifies looking at even strength percentages for evidence of Brodeur's performance.
So if you're thinking about what Brodeur really needs to do for 2011-12 to have a better season, then I suggest looking at even strength play. It doesn't vary much from season to season; and the fact it went down by .012 last season could be a reason to be a little concerned. As for special team situations, count on a few shorthanded goals that will surely be enraging and count on a sub-90% percentage on the power play. It may more constructive to hope the Devils remain near the bottom in the league in taking calls; and hope the power play units don't make too many heinous errors.
However, as I'll show tomorrow in the summary of the goals allowed review, I don't think Brodeur needs to do too much different in 2011-12. Until then, what do you think of these percentages? What do you make of the notion that the even strength percentage is less variable and higher than save percentages for either special team situations? Are you more convinced of using even strength save percentages instead of total save percentage? Don't you wish the league would have these numbers going further back than 1997-98? Please leave your answers and other thoughts about Brodeur after the jump.
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Comparing Brodeur's SV% to the Team's Performance
I wanted to find an answer to John’s question, “what happened prior to the lockout that caused Brodeur to not put up similar numbers?” To do this I looked at the NHL’s available special team statistics for the same span of years. What I found was a lot of numbers that I want to do something with eventually, but I will focus on John’s question of what changed before and after the lockout.
I will start with the Devils Penalty Killing success prior to the lockout, from 1997 through 2004. For this period the Devils found themselves shorthanded a total of 2062 times, an average of 295 times a season. They surrendered a total of 290 goals against, an average of 41 goals per season. Their success rate over this span was a respectable 85.9%, which matches their season-by-season average. The deviations are even fairly small. The standard deviation in the number of opportunities is 28 (over the course of a season) and the deviation in goals against is only 5.65. The deviation in PK% was 1.52%.
That last number is of particular note. If I’m reading John’s tables correctly (and I hope I am) then the standard deviation in Brodeur’s SV% while killing penalties is 2.21%. This is virtually in-line with the team’s success rate deviation of 1.52%. Before the lockout the team’s Penalty Kill success and Martin Brodeur’s success against opposing team’s power plays are tightly coupled.
After the lockout we see a different picture emerging. From 2005 through 2011 the Devils found themselves short-handed 1737 times, an average of 290 times a season, only five less than before the lockout. However, the standard deviation in the number of penalty kills nearly doubled from 28 prior to the lockout to 46 afterwards. The Devils surrendered a total 303 power play goals against since the lockout, an average of 51 per season, up by 10 goals per season compared to the years leading up to the lockout. The deviation in goals against, as you can assume, also doubled, from 5.65 before the lockout to 11.74 after it.
So the Devils are averaging nearly the same number of Penalty Kills per season as they were before the lockout, but now they are giving up nearly ten more goals per season and they have become wildly inconsistent compared to their former selves. This seems to contradict Brodeur’s numbers while killing penalties, which have both gone up and become slightly more consistent since the lockout.
So what happened? As John pointed out the Devils’ defensive corps has been much more unstable since the lockout and overall less effective (as expected from losing Stevens, Daneyko, Rafalski and Niedermayer). This would seem to directly correlate to the team’s reduced effectiveness on the Penalty Kill. However, Brodeur has become more effective on the Penalty Kill.
Unfortunately I don’t have a good answer to why Marty remains consistent when killing penalties while the Devils themselves have become more unpredictable. Could the inflated numbers from 2005-06 (the first season under the new rules) be skewing the averages? Could the number of games played by Scott Clemmensen and Johan Hedberg while Brodeur was injured since the lockout be further affecting the team’s performance? I suspect these are both possibilities as the Devils worst year for killing penalties (79.9%) was the 2008-09 season which saw Brodeur only play 31 games.
All I can conclude is that Brodeur is still a consistent backstop on the penalty kill but the Devils have become an inconsistent team there. This is something the team will have to improve if they’re going to be successful this season.
brodeur got better after the lockout. just because players typically have a ‘prime’ from 25-30 doesn’t mean that every player does, especially not goaltenders, who are wildly unpredictable.
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This is a valid point – the “prime years” concept is something I still get caught in.
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by John Fischer on Aug 11, 2011 1:57 PM EDT via mobile up reply actions
What do you make of the notion that the even strength percentage is less variable and higher than save percentages for either special team situations?
Sample size.
Don’t you wish the league would have these numbers going further back than 1997-98?
Absolutely. There’s a lot of ‘dead’ data somewhere in the NHL archives that someone should be going through and releasing. I also wish they’d catch up and start breaking down the shooters by team strength as well. If they can split out the goalies, there should be no reason they can’t split out the forwards.
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All the ES numbers tell me that Marty and the Devils have been incredibly consistent since 1997. Post lockout, with a more wide open game and arguably a weaker defensive corps, Marty sees only two extra shots per game and lets in ~ 0.06 more goals per game (at ES). Those are some small changes. Granted, part of the post-lockout change was more penalties.
Brodeur has averaged 69 games per year since 1997. In the 3 post-lockout seasons where he has played 70+ games, he’s average 1667 saves. The difference in his pre and post lockout save percentage at ES for that number of shots is 8 goals a year. Anyone know if there is a sabermetric formula to convert goals to wins?
3 goals is worth roughly 1 point in the standings
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by George E. Ays on Aug 11, 2011 2:57 PM EDT up reply actions
Last Year's Suspect Defence
Nice post, John. Thanks. How important to these stats do you think is the number of times our defense hung Marty and Moose out to dry last year? With all of our injuries, bad defensive philosophy, and rookie defensemen before Jacques LeMaire came back, I’d think that Marty’s numbers really took a hit. Is there any truth to that?
I think so – to a point. Check out the most recent post a fuller explaination.
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by John Fischer on Aug 12, 2011 8:59 AM EDT via mobile up reply actions
Thought I'd just bring in some SQN stats
The first number is Brodeur’s shot quality neutral save percentage (as calculated by Alan Ryder), and the second and third are where the Devils ranked in shots allowed and shot quality.
2002-03: 0.906, 1st, 1st
2003-04: 0.909, 1st, 1st
2005-06: 0.902, 10th, 1st
2006-07: 0.917, 8th, 4th
2007-08: 0.918, 8th, 9th
2008-09: 0.907, 12th, 1st
2009-10: 0.910, 2nd, 1st
This makes the 2006-07 and 2007-08 seasons stand out even more. Those were the only two seasons (well, obviously excluding the last one) where the Devils weren’t first in shot quality allowed. This makes the performance differences in these two seasons relatively stand out. I wouldn’t go so far to say that Brodeur deserved those two Vezinas (the best argument can be made for 2006-07, but I still would probably favour Luongo), but those were the first seasons since his early prime that Brodeur could justifiably be included amongst the very best in the league. His resilience, especially with a considerable workload, is impressive, and I expect him to have a bounce back year next season.
Excuse my ignorance, but who is Alan Ryder and how did he develop shot quality neutral save percentage?
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by John Fischer on Aug 15, 2011 12:01 AM EDT up reply actions
He's the founder of HockeyAnalytics.com
And I believe this PDF file from 2003 is the first article of his about shot quality and determining shot quality neutral save percentage.
by TheGuineaPig on Aug 15, 2011 10:16 AM EDT up reply actions

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